WILSONCMT.PRN3

10/10/2005 9:50 PM

REMOVING VIOLENT PARENTS FROM THE HOME:
A TEST CASE FOR THE PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH
Robin Fretwell Wilson, J.D.*

I. INTRODUCTION
Every once in a while, a ground shaking, paradigm-shifting idea is
advanced that seems, after the fact, obvious. It is perhaps the
obviousness of the idea that explains both why it escaped notice for so
long and why it holds the promise for lasting, meaningful reform.
Professor Marsha Garrison advances just such an idea: that child
maltreatment, like any serious public health problem, demands a
medical, not an ideological, response” and should emphasize
“prevention, the key to most successful public health campaigns.”1
Marshalling damning evidence that “after more than twenty years of
state and federal initiatives aimed at bettering the prospects of abused
and neglected children”2 with few gains and little progress, Professor
Garrison goes back to the beginning to discern how the child protection
services (“CPS”) system managed to get so far off track. She lays blame
at the feet of reformers, who relied not on evidence but on a “simplistic,
anti-authoritarian ideology that cast the state child welfare system as
villain and the families served by that system as victims.”3 These
reformers neglected to see how limited the treatment options they could
offer families were, or the lack of hard data about their efficacy.4
As Professor Garrison documents, many of the formative decisions
giving us the modern CPS system were not sufficiently fleshed out at the
*
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2 Id. at 594.
3 Id. at 596.
4 Id. at 597.
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time they were made. Making decisions with imperfect information is,
sadly, the context in which regulators always operate.5 There is, of
course, nothing malign about making decisions with limited information
if the decisions represent honest suppositions that just did not pan out.
However, once the decisions are made, Professor Garrison makes clear,
the child welfare system never manages to go back and assess the
decisions anew, with better and more information in hand.6 She argues
that the CPS system should evaluate its efforts in light of new evidence,
as any medical system would.7 This call for a searching selfexamination based on hard evidence, at once obvious and overlooked,
may be the most significant point Professor Garrison makes.
The reasons why regulators should pay attention to Professor
Garrison’s reframing go much deeper, however. Professor Garrison’s
public health lens can do useful work at the micro level, evaluating and
fine tuning day-in-and-day-out decisions, just as on a macro level it can
guide the structure of the CPS system. Day-in and day-out decisions,
like the structural decisions Professor Garrison unclothes, have deep
value choices embedded within them that sometimes turn out with
scrutiny to be mere wishful thinking or groundless supposition.
This Comment will use the public health lens Professor Garrison has
developed so richly to look at one of the most critical questions CPS
caseworkers and other decision makers face thousands of times a day:
whether to remove a child who is a possible victim of abuse or neglect
from his or her home. Removal, as Professor Garrison observes, is the
reflexive, instantaneous default at the inception of most CPS
investigations.8 Yet, it need not be if the question of initial response
was analyzed with the evidence-based approach Professor Garrison
advocates.
5 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the
Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 24, on
file with author) (noting that social science evidence can predict certain results, “but it
cannot answer the tough value choices that have to be made at the limits of our
knowledge”); David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the
Duty to Rescue (under review/forthcoming 2005) (unpublished manuscript at 51, on file
with author) (discussing the role of personal preference when a claim [is] not supported
by data).
6 Garrison, supra note 1, at 596-600.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 591 (“While child protection services were theoretically tailored to each
family’s needs, out-of-home placement was virtually the only alternative actually
offered.”).

WILSONCMT.PRN3

640

10/10/2005 9:50 PM

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 12:3

Like the myths that shaped the CPS system into one that sometimes
ill-serves the interests of children, a cluster of wrong-headed beliefs and
misunderstandings drive the decision to remove a child, often
needlessly, from his or her home. Few decisions are as determinative of
a child’s well being and long-term prospects as the decision to remove or
not. As Professor Garrison observes, a child who is removed is “at
serious risk” of being stranded in “unstable and impermanent
placements, until adulthood.”9 A removed child may lose all contact
with his or her family for long stretches of time,10 may “develop
feelings of guilt or unworthiness, especially if [he or she] was the one to
disclose the abuse,”11 and may experience serious psychological damage
or physical abuse while placed outside the home.12 Sometimes removal
“place[s] a child in a more detrimental situation than he would be in
without intervention.”13
Yet, CPS caseworkers often see no other recourse when a parent or
other adult in the child’s home is accused of abuse.14 Many believe,
wrongly, that a non-abusing parent who fails once to protect the child
from the abusing parent will do so again and again.15 Many
caseworkers also believe, wrongly, that excluding alleged offenders
from the home is legally impermissible; consequently they believe there
is no safe choice but to remove the child.16 Ironically, many
caseworkers and other decision makers falsely believe that only the
child-victim is at risk from the alleged offender, and therefore remove
only that child. Yet, in cases of intra-familial sexual abuse, perpetrators
rarely stop with the first victim. In one study of perpetrators, four-fifths
of biological father offenders abused more than one child in the
9 Id. at 594.
10 Robert J. Levy, Using “Scientific” Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23
FAM. L.Q. 383, 386 (1989). See also Garrison, supra note 1, at 591 (noting the
possibility of a rift in relationships with the child’s biological family).
11 Patricia Ryan et al., Removal of the Perpetrator versus Removal of the Victim in
Cases of Intrafamilial Child Sexual Abuse, in 123 ABUSED AND BATTERED: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 125 (Dean D. Kundsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds.,
1991).
12 See Levy, supra note 10, at 386.
13 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (1975).
14 See infra Part II (describing empirical factors motivating the decision to remove a
child).
15 See infra Part IV (summarizing studies showing that most caseworkers fiercely
believe that non-offending parents share blame for the victim’s abuse).
16 See infra Part III (documenting CPS caseworkers’ misapprehensions about the
legality of removing alleged offenders from the home).
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household by their own account.17 In a second study of father-daughter
incest, biological fathers molested eighty-two percent of all daughters
available to them, while stepfather-offenders molested seventy percent
of all daughters.18 This Comment argues that the child protection
system legally can, and should, remove the alleged offender from the
home rather than removing the child-victim.
Using Professor Garrison’s evidence-based approach, this Comment
demonstrates that we have come a long way since Florence Rush asked
in 1974, “[h]as anyone thought of the fantastic notion of getting rid of
the [accused] father?”19 Part II dissects the empirical factors driving the
decision to remove children from their home. It examines how judges
and legislators in nine states have laid the groundwork for excluding the
alleged offender pending a full investigation so that this response is no
longer unthinkable, unachievable, or fraught with enormous legal risk.
Part III illustrates that baseless suppositions of “maternal culpability”20
have led caseworkers reflexively to remove the victim, rather than
pursuing the more direct and meaningful remedy of removing the threat
to the child’s safety. Part IV argues that a shift in CPS’ default remedy
protects not only the victim, but his or her siblings who, left within the
alleged offender’s immediate grasp, would likely become the next
victim. Finally, Part V considers and ultimately rejects several possible
limitations of accepting as the default remedy in cases of alleged child
abuse, the exclusion of the alleged offender from the home.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION TO REMOVE CHILDREN
Traditionally, ensuring an alleged victim’s safety meant removing
the child from the home and evaluating the merits of the allegations
later. In cases of sexual abuse, that approach lead to an abysmal reality.
Only less than ten percent of offenders are removed from the child’s
17 Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Sexual Abuse by Paternal Caretakers: A Comparison of
Abusers Who Are Biological Fathers in Intact Families, Stepfathers, and Noncustodial
Fathers, in 65 THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT
67-68 (Anne L. Horton et al. eds., 1990).
18 Patricia Phelan, The Process of Incest: Biologic Father and Stepfather Families, 10
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, 531, 534 (1986).
19 Florence Rush, The Sexual Abuse of Children: A Feminist Point of View, in 64
RAPE: THE FIRST SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN 71 (Noreen Connell & Cassandra Wilson,
New York Radical Feminists ed., 1974).
20 REBECCA M. BOLEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: ITS SCOPE AND OUR FAILURE 193
(Kluwer Academic 2001).
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environment for more than a year.21 Less than two percent of all
suspected offenders are convicted, while only seven percent of offenders
whose abuse is substantiated are jailed for more than a year.22
In a study of factors influencing the state’s decision to remove a
child from her home, Theodore Cross and colleagues found that “the
decision not to prosecute was the strongest predictor of child placement”
outside the home.23 The prosecution decision matters because “[i]f
cases are not accepted for prosecution . . . the child’s removal from the
home . . . may be the only way to protect the child.”24 In this instance,
child placement is seen as “the lesser of the two evils.”25
This Hobson’s choice grows out of a deep misconception that CPS
cannot legally exclude offenders from their homes absent prosecution —
despite the fact that states can, and do, remove children from their homes
everyday.26 Rebecca Bolen, a child abuse researcher, observes that
“[r]emoving the alleged offender instead of the victim from the child’s
environment . . . may be one of the most difficult, policy changes
because it conflicts with society’s presumption that the accused is
innocent until proven guilty.”27 Christopher Bagley and Kathleen King
have also argued that “[a] proper legal framework which would enable
the child to remain with her mother while the alleged offender is
removed, still has to be established.”28
Child abuse researchers are not alone in believing that the exclusion
of offenders from their homes is legally risky. Law professor Katherine
Pearson notes that “so-called voluntary agreement[s]” in which CPS
workers negotiate a parent’s exit rather than removing the child, open
“the door to recovery of damages from the social worker because of
violations of the parents’ rights to substantive and procedural due

21 Rebecca M. Bolen, Non-offending Mothers of Sexually Abused Children: A Case of
Institutionalized Sexism?, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1336, 1350 (2003) [hereinafter
Non-offending Mothers].
22 Id.
23 Theodore P. Cross et al., The Criminal Justice System and Child Placement in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 32, 41 (1999).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 42.
26 NAT’L CENTER FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 278-79 (3rd ed. 2002).
27 Non-offending Mothers, supra note 21, at 1358.
28 CHRISTOPHER BAGELY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE SEARCH FOR
HEALING 101 (1991).
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process under the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Given these views, it is
hardly surprising that over ninety percent of offenders “are allowed to
stay within the child’s environment, whereas the majority of children are
removed from their homes.”30
In contrast to the United States, ultimatums to parents to exit the
home are customary in other countries. In Great Britain the accused
parent can be ordered “to leave a dwelling-house in which he is living
with the child.”31 This is the “preferred course of action” when a child
is at risk from someone living in their home.32
The United States actually shares more common ground with Great
Britain than scholars and caseworkers realize. Nine jurisdictions in the
United States explicitly authorize state judges to issue, and CPS agencies
to seek, protective orders directing an alleged offender to vacate the
home.33 Absent egregious conduct, courts routinely insulate case
29 Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional
Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 835, 83637 (1998).
30 BOLEN, supra note 20, at 258.
31 Children Act, 1989, Ch. 41, s.38A (Eng.).
32 RANDALL EASTON WICKHAM & JANET WEST, THERAPEUTIC WORK WITH SEXUALLY
ABUSED CHILDREN 153 (2002). In New South Wales, Australia, legal reforms have
recommended that the Parliament amend its existing statutes to require the alleged
perpetrator to leave the home before removing the child. Email from Patrick Parkinson,
Professor of Law, University of Sydney, to Robin Fretwell Wilson, Associate Professor
of Law, University of Maryland School of Law (Dec. 6, 2004) (on file with author).
33 These jurisdictions include Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Guam. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-53(f) (Michie
2004) (providing that before placing the child in foster care, the court first consider the
removal or continued removal of the alleged perpetrator from the child’s family home);
KY. JEFFERSON FAM. CT. R. 68 (establishing that at the adjudication hearing the judge
may “[o]rder the alleged perpetrator to stay out of the family home”); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22 § 4036(1)(F-1) (2004) (establishing that in a protection order, the court may
consider removing the perpetrator from the child’s home); 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 13316
(2004) (providing that before placing the child in foster care, the court first consider the
removal or continued removal of the alleged perpetrator from the child’s family home);
NY Fam. Ct. Act § 842 (2004) (stating that any order of protection issued pursuant to
this section can require the parent “to stay away from the home” of the child); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (2004) (authorizing protective orders to direct the removal of
the perpetrator from the home); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-152 (2004) (that on application
of the department or the children protection team, the court may order the removal of a
suspected perpetrator of child sexual abuse from the home where the child resides); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (Vernon 2004) (mandating that, if the government
determines “that child abuse has occurred and that the child would be protected in the
child’s home by the removal of the alleged perpetrator of the abuse,” the government
“shall file a petition for the removal of the alleged perpetrator from the residence of the
child rather than attempt to remove the child from the residence”); WASH. REV. CODE
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workers from liability when they give alleged offenders ultimatums to
leave their homes.34
A. Absolute and Qualified Immunity for CPS Workers
Some courts give CPS caseworkers absolute immunity like that
given to judges for the performance of certain duties, largely so that they
are “free to exercise their discretion without fear of personal
consequences.”35 Without such insulation, “[i]ndividual caseworkers
and supervisors facing the possibility of losing their life savings in a law
suit might allow fear to influence their decisions, intentionally or
otherwise.”36
Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
extends absolute immunity to state CPS workers when investigating
child abuse allegations, performing placement services, or placing a
child in a foster home.37 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit confers absolute immunity on guardians ad litem who
represent the child’s interests when “testifying in court, prosecuting
custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and recommendations
to the court.”38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ANN. § 26.44.063 (2004) (declaring that “[i]t is the intent of the legislature to minimize
trauma to a child involved in an allegation of sexual or physical abuse. The legislature
declares that removing the child from the home often has the further effect of further
traumatizing the child. It is therefore, the legislature’s intent that the alleged offender,
rather than the child, shall be removed from the home” at the earliest possible point of
intervention).
It is possible that other jurisdictions would permit judges to exclude alleged offenders
from the home on the basis of case law or the general powers granted to courts over
children in need of assistance. For instance, in Maryland, a court on its own motion can
issue an order “directing, restraining, or otherwise controlling the conduct of a person
who is properly before the court [like a parent], if the court finds that the conduct (1) is
or may be detrimental or harmful to a child over whom the court has jurisdiction; . . . or
(3) . . . is necessary for the welfare of the child.” MD CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-821.
34 See infra Part II (discussing immunity afforded to CPS works when directing the
father to leave the child’s home).
35 Caroline Turner English, Stretching the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-Judicial
Immunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 759, 768 (1996).
36 Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 871 F. Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), complaint
dissumissed on summary judgment, 882 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 84 f.3d
511 (2d Cir. 1996).
37 See, e.g., Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101,
1108 (9th Cir. 2001); Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); Miller v.
Gammie, 292 F.3d 982, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2002).
38 Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989). Dependency and termination
proceedings are distinct. The decision to take protective steps on behalf of a child is
made in a dependency proceeding, which is initiated by CPS. Id. Once the court finds a
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has also extended absolute immunity to CPS workers, a psychologist,
and two psychiatrists in suits terminating parental rights.39
Other courts provide a more limited form of qualified immunity
where state officials still enjoy broad protection from civil liability under
qualified immunity. As the Third Circuit explained in Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services,
[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the government from interfering in familial
relationships unless the government adheres to the
requirements of procedural and substantive due
process. . . .
In determining whether [a parent’s]
constitutionally protected interests were violated, we
must balance the fundamental liberty interests of the
family unit with the compelling interests of the state in
protecting children from abuse.40
Although fundamental, the rights of parents in their children are not
unlimited. Instead they are:
limited by the compelling governmental interests in the
protection of children particularly where the children
need to be protected from their own parents. The right
to familial integrity, in other words, does not include a
right to remain free from child abuse investigations . . . .
Whatever disruption or disintegration of family life [a
parent] may have suffered as a result of [a] child abuse
investigation does not, in and of itself, constitute a
constitutional deprivation . . . .41
Under this calculus, a social worker receives qualified immunity
where he or she acts on the basis of “some reasonable and articulable
child dependent, the state may take a number of different remedial steps. Generally,
these steps include placing the child with a relative or in foster care, leaving the child in
the home under CPS’ protective supervision, or requiring the abusive parent to
participate in treatment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.52(1)(b) (2004). In contrast,
when the state initiates a proceeding to terminate parental rights, it seeks to sever the
parent-child relationship permanently. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982)
(explaining that the state must show grounds to terminate parental rights by clear and
convincing evidence).
39 See, e.g., Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984).
40 Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Serv., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d
Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 1125-26 (citations omitted).
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evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been
abused or is in imminent danger of abuse”42 or, in the words of another
court, upon “an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse.”43 If such a
basis exists, CPS will be justified in removing either a child or a parent
from the home, “even where later investigation proves no abuse
occurred.”44
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals appears to ratchet up the level of
protection for caseworkers even further. It has said that,
a social worker acting to separate parent and child . . .
rarely will have the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate
fashion, as prison medical officials can. As a result, in
order for liability to attach, a social worker need not
have acted with the “purpose to cause harm,” but the
standard of culpability for substantive due process
purposes must exceed both negligence and deliberate
indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or
arbitrariness that indeed “shocks the conscience.” 45
Importantly, in analyzing claims of due process violations by
“excluded” parents, courts apply precisely the same test they apply when
considering whether children should have been removed.46 They have
not crafted more exacting tests, as one would expect, if a parent’s
interests in not being excluded from the home are so much greater than
the child’s interests in not being removed.47
42
43

Id. at 1126.
Puricelli v. Houston, No. CIV.A.99-2982, 2000 WL 760522, at *8 (E.D.Pa. June
12, 2000).
44 Croft, 103 F.3d at 1126.
45 Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999); see also,
Doman v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 1224906, at *2 (E.D.Pa. 2000) (“The Third
Circuit [in Miller] has made it clear that when it comes to a social worker’s interference
with the parent-child relationship, only conduct that is so arbitrary as to shock the
conscience may be considered violative of a parent’s substantive due process rights.”).
46 See, e.g., Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 871 F. Supp. at 629 (noting that “[h]asty
and poorly made decisions to remove children from their homes violate the constitutional
rights of both parents and children,” and applying the same test to parental exclusion as it
applied to child removal).
47 Excluded parents have framed their deprivation in terms of rights of association
with the child, the same interest aaserted by children who have been improperly
removed. See id. Both parents and children have an interest in maintaining family ties.
As a consequence, the judicial analysis for exclusion of a parent and removal of the child
have been identical. It is conceivable, however, that parents might bring suits for the
deprivation of other constitutional rights — such as a suit alleging a taking of private
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B. CPS Workers and Agencies Are Given Wide Latitude in Acting
Of course, tests like these are abstractions. It is their application to
specific facts that reveals the vast latitude courts have given
caseworkers. Gottlieb v. County of Orange, a case in which an excluded
father ultimately failed to recover against anyone after appealing to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals several times, is a good example of the
great latitude given to caseworkers.48 CPS caseworkers directed
Gottlieb to either leave his home based on his alleged abuse of his
daughter, or face her removal.49 The father exited for a month and later
sued, alleging violations of his civil rights.50 The Court found that the
caseworkers had an objectively reasonable basis for acting and were
therefore immune from suit, even though they never investigated the
anonymous informant’s background or motives, failed to question the
daughter in a neutral, nondirective manner, and asked “neither the
daughter’s teacher nor the school nurse, if the child exhibited any
behavioral oddities.”51 The Court refused to fault the caseworkers
because they had not been trained in more sophisticated and less
suggestive means of interviewing.52
The father in the case also sued the County and its Department of
Social Services (“Department”).53 While the lower court initially
denied requests to have the claim dismissed, the court ultimately granted
summary judgment to the County in a later round of litigation based on
undisputed evidence that the County adequately trained its
caseworkers.54 The Department also acted reasonably, the Court found,
in issuing an ultimatum to exit without “pausing to obtain a court order”
since their source reported ongoing abuse, the daughter herself described
repeated molestations at her father’s hands, said that her father did not
like tattletales, and said that she expected to be punished for talking
property. In this instance, the character of the constitutional deprivation would be
grounded in an interest that is not shared by the child—ownership of private property—
and so may not evoke an equivalency with the child’s interests.
48 Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1996).
49 Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 871 F. Supp. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), complaint
dissumissed on summary judgment, 882 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 84 f.3d
511 (2d Cir. 1996).
50 Id. at 627.
51 Id. at 630.
52 Id. at 629.
53 Id. at 627.
54 Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 882 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 84 f.3d
511 (2d Cir. 1996).
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about it outside of the home.55 In the final analysis, the father prevailed
against no defendant.56
Consider also the Third Circuit’s decision in Miller v. City of
Philadelphia, which involved the temporary removal of three children
from their mother based on a sloppy investigation.57 A CPS investigator
asked the children leading questions, requested that the mother produce
all three children for a physical exam even though the abuse allegation
pertained to only one child, met secretly with a hospital social worker,
excluded the mother’s attorney from the waiting area outside the
examination room, and was advised by a doctor that it was not clear
whether the child’s bruises were accidental or the result of physical
abuse.58 Not surprisingly, the caseworker received employment reviews
that he did not always follow proper procedures.59 Still, the Court
concluded that “[e]ven if all of the facts alleged . . . were true, [the
investigator] did not act in a way that shocks the conscience.”60 Clearly,
Miller sets a high bar for actionable conduct.
Similarly, in In re A.H.,61 the court considered a father’s complaint
about his removal from the home. Although the father alleged a number
of due process violations, the court could not “find fault in the [lower]
court’s decision to remove Father from the home” since the daughter
was abused by him and qualified as a child in need of supervision.62
The same treatment extends to physical abuse cases. For instance, in
Patterson v. Armstrong County Children and Youth Services, county
officials were found to have acted reasonably when they temporarily
removed a 15-year old daughter based on the fact that her mother pulled
the child from their car by her hair, “wrestled her to the ground and
pushed her face in the gravel driveway.”63 This caused minor bruises,
cuts and scrapes, and the child arrived at school visibly distressed.64

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 520.
Id. at 522.
Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 377.
Id.
In re A.H., 751 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 700 (noting that the due process issue was unremarkable).
Patterson v. Armstrong County Children & Youth Serv., 141 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522
(W.D. Pa. 2001).
64 Id. at 522-23.
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As this review of the cases makes apparent, the courts afford wide
latitude to caseworkers in their decisions to remove either the children or
the abusing parents from the home in a number of contexts, despite due
process challenges that excluded parents often raise.
C. Courts Will Overlook CPS Misdeeds When Others Could Correct
Them
Even particularly egregious acts may be insulated from liability
where a wronged parent cannot connect the act to the alleged
constitutional violation. In Miller v. City of Philadelphia, a mother who
temporarily lost custody of her three children alleged that a child welfare
worker attempted to induce the examining hospital to falsify records and
misrepresent the physician’s medical report to the judge who issued the
temporary child custody order.65 The trial court found that the
caseworker was not entitled to qualified immunity.66 After several
rounds of appeals, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
“even if [the caseworker] did misrepresent the doctor’s report to [the
prosecutor, the mother] failed to establish a causal connection between
the alleged misrepresentation and the Judge’s decision to grant a
separation order.”67 Although she had ample opportunity, the mother
chose not to depose the physician or prosecutor, “both of whom would
have had direct knowledge of [the caseworker’s] misstatements or
misdeeds.”68 Moreover, the prosecutor “spoke independently with [the
physician] to ascertain his opinion,” which “should have served to
expose any lies.”69 Consequently, “any subsequent misstatements by
[the prosecutor] to the Judge during their telephone hearing would not
have been caused by” the caseworker.70 Even these questionable tactics
by a CPS agency failed to trigger findings of Due Process violations.
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit tossed
out a jury verdict in favor of an excluded father where he failed to avail
himself of opportunities to clarify how long he needed to stay away.71
In Terry v. Richardson, a three-year old girl, Jaidah, returned from visits

65
66

Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1997), claim
dismissed by 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999).
67 Miller, 174 F.3d at 374.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 377.
71 Terry v. Richardson, 346 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
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at her father’s house withdrawn and afraid of other men.72 When asked
by her mother whether she and her father had any “secrets,” Jaidah said
yes — at which time her mother, Richelle, contacted Cheryl Richardson,
a caseworker.73 Richardson left Jaidah’s father, John Terry, a message
the next morning informing him that he should not see or contact
Jaidah.74 John Terry called back and seemed to understand the
reasoning.75 Two physicians corroborated the existence of sexual abuse,
and for the next month and a half Jaidah continued to implicate her
father when questioned about the abuse.76 During this time, Jaidah
missed one scheduled visit with Terry because of illness.77
Richardson interviewed Terry fifteen days into the investigation and
again advised him not to contact Jaidah until the investigation was
complete.78 On the forty-eighth day, she called Terry to inform him that
her investigation was complete and that Jaidah’s accusations seemed
valid.79 Terry denied ever having received the message. Richelle then
obtained an order prohibiting Terry’s visitation with Jaidah.80
Subsequently, a dependency court81 found that Jaidah had been abused,
but not by Terry.82 Terry brought suit against Richardson and a jury
awarded him $2,062 and Jaidah $7,210.83
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the verdict, finding no constitutional rights had been infringed.84 The
court reasoned that, first, Terry had ample opportunity to ask Richardson
about the extent of her authority; and second, any incursion on Terry’s
rights was minor—at most, Richardson prevented Terry from seeing
Jaidah for one day.85 While the court noted that “arbitrary abuses of

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id. at 783-784.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 784.
Id.
Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining the purpose of a
dependency proceeding).
82 Terry, 346 F.3d at 784.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 787-88.
85 Id. at 785-86.
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government power are checked by requiring objective justification for
steps taken during the investigation,” it found such justification here.86
D. Caseworkers Stepping Over The Line
Although courts accord caseworkers significant protection,
caseworkers can nonetheless exceed even the wide latitude given them.
Suborning perjury, inducing medical providers to falsify records, or
misrepresenting a medical report to the presiding judge, as alleged in
Miller, all may jeopardize the immunity courts are prepared to confer.87
In addition to the above, reckless disregard for the facts is also not
prudent. In Croft v. Westmoreland County Chilfren & Youth Services,
the court found that a caseworker lacked “objectively reasonable
grounds” when she threatened a father that she would remove his child if
he did not exit the home.88 The caseworker’s threat was based on an
anonymous tip passed along a chain of four persons and lacked
corroboration.89 The caseworker acknowledged that she renewed her
ultimatum to the father even after her interviews with the informing
parties left her with no “opinion one way or the other” that the father
was sexually abusing his son.90
Furthermore, where an objectively reasonable basis does not clearly
support a caseworker’s actions, courts will allow litigation to proceed
beyond the summary judgment stage. In Puricelli et al. v. Houston et
86

Id. at 787. Like the actions of caseworkers, court orders also enjoy significant
deference. Protective orders on behalf of sexually abused children have been upheld in
numerous cases, even where the order impacts the offending parent’s access to the
residence he shared with the child. See Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming visitation to father who committed sexual battery upon
the parties’ three-year daughter); Keneker v. Keneker, 579 So.2d 1083, 1084-1085 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1991) (finding petition for final protective order was viable where father
was temporarily restrained from custody and visitation with his daughter with whom he
“engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior”); Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d 376, 378-379
(Me. 1990) (affirming protective order suspending father’s right of contact with a child
for 1 year, where father sexually abused child). As Besharov explains, “orders of
protection are rarely struck down as ‘unreasonable.’ Few are appealed, and, when they
are, appellate courts tend to rely on the expertise” of the lower court. Douglas J.
Besharov, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. 842 (2004).
87 Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1997), claim
dismissed by 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999).
88 Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Serv., 103 F.3d 1123, 1127 (3d
Cir. 1997).
89 Id. at 1126-1127.
90 Id. at 1127 (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the social
worker).
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al., a social worker allegedly issued an ultimatum to a father suspected
of abuse to leave his home based on an anonymous and uncorroborated
report of abuse.91 By allowing the father’s lawsuit to proceed to trial,
the court permitted a jury to decide whether the social worker had a
reasonable basis for issuing the ultimatum.92
E. What’s So Radical About Excluding Accused Offenders?
Although caseworkers can issue ultimatums to alleged abusers to
exit their homes without risking a lawsuit, a stronger case needs to be
made for excluding alleged offenders and leaving the children in place.
There are compelling reasons for taking this approach.
A child who has endured abuse at the hands of an adult should not
then be subjected to the “double victimization” of “system-induced
trauma” that force children to leave familiar surroundings and the
comfort of their mothers and siblings.93
This trauma can be
considerable.
A removed child is often cut off from all contact with the nonabusing parent for extended periods of time.94 The removed child may
“develop feelings of guilt or unworthiness, especially if [he or she] was
the one to disclose the abuse.”95 While not every removed child is
fostered, those who are placed in foster care may experience serious
psychological damage.96
Sometimes removal places a child in a more detrimental situation
than he would be in without intervention.97 A 1999 study found that
foster care was a significant risk factor for sexual abuse and that foster
parents were the perpetrator in nearly one third of the cases studied.98

91

Puricelli v. Houston, No. CIV.A.99-2982, 2000 WL 760522, at *8 (E.D.Pa. June
12, 2000).
92 Id. at *19.
93 BAGELY & KING, supra note 28, at 101; Kee MacFarlane & Josephine Bulkley,
Treating Child Sexual Abuse: An Overview of Current Program Models, 1 J. SOC. WORK
AND HUMAN SEXUALITY 69, 71-72 (1982).
94 Levy, supra note 10, at 23.
95 Ryan et al., supra note 11.
96 Wald, supra note 13, at 993-995.
97 Id. at 994-996.
98 Georgina F. Hobbs et al., Abuse of Children in Foster and Residential Care, 23
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1239, 1243 (1999).
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In another study, foster fathers and other foster family members were the
perpetrators of abuse in over two-thirds of the substantiated cases.99
In many instances, the child’s abuse at the hands of a foster parent is
no surprise to the State. In a 1991 study, James Rosenthal and colleagues
found that reports of child sexual abuse while in out-of-home placements
— defined to include family foster care, group homes, residential
treatment, and institutions — were the most likely to be confirmed.100
Moreover, Rosenthal and colleagues found that in twenty-seven percent
of all maltreatment reports, prior allegations against the perpetrator were
present.101 As Richard Gelles notes, “in some cases, foster parents are
actually more dangerous to the child than the biological parents.”102
Excluding the alleged perpetrator makes the home a safer
environment not only for the victim, but also for every child in the
house, as Part IV documents more fully.103 Exclusion also offers
benefits in addition to safety. The support a child receives from her nonoffending parent moderates the long-term effects of the abuse.104
Even where a child is not directly victimized, removal can be a bad
idea. Separation frustrates the “laborious task of putting lives back
together,”105 since the “essential nucleus” of the healing process is the
mother-child relationship.106 Removal also exposes the child to a litany
of ills caused by “foster care drift.”107 The extent of this dislocation
cannot be understated. In one study, thirteen percent of sexually abused
99

Mary I. Benedict & Susan Zurvain, The Reported Health and Functioning of
Children Maltreated While in Family Foster Care, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 561,
563 (1996).
100 James A. Rosenthal et al., A Descriptive Study of Abuse and Neglect in Out-ofHome Placement, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 249, 253 (1991).
101 Id.
102 RICHARD J. GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: HOW PRESERVING FAMILIES CAN COST
CHILDREN’S LIVES 162 (Perseus 1996).
103 Cross et al., supra note 23. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse:
Evaluating the Danger Posed By A Sexually Predatory Parent to A Victim’s Siblings, 51
EMORY L.J. 241, 251-258 (2002) [hereinafter Cradle of Abuse].
104 See, e.g., Jon R. Conte & John R. Schuerman, Factors Associated With an
Increased Impact of Child Sexual Abuse, 11 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 201, 207-208
(1987); Mark D. Everson et al., Maternal Support Following Disclosure of Incest, 59
AM. J. ORTHOPSYHCIATRY 197, 206 (1989).
105 JUDITH HERMAN & LISA HIRSCHMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 144 (Harvard
University Press, 1981).
106 Id. at 145.
107 ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN , CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS 714
(West Group 1999).
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children placed in foster care experienced six or more different
displacements.108
Disrupting the parent’s life, rather than the child’s, is preferable
where the allegations initially appear true or, worse, are ultimately
founded. As one court noted in a domestic violence case, “[a] victim
of . . . outrageous and life-threatening sort of abuse . . . cannot be held
hostage to the potential homelessness of her abuser, who created the
intolerable situation in the first instance.”109
Exclusion seems
especially compelling where “the father . . . is responsible for the choice
to eroticize [his] relationship with [his child].”110 He should “bear the
consequences of that choice even when he is not prosecuted.”111
Otherwise, offenders are externalizing the cost of their behavior to their
victims who, ironically, are removed for their own safety.
Guam and Hawaii essentially take this approach. In Guam, the court
must first give “due consideration to ordering the removal of the alleged
perpetrator . . . from the child’s family home” before removing the
child.112 In Guam and Hawaii, the child’s family bears the “burden of
establishing that it is not in the best interests of the child that the alleged
perpetrator be removed from the family’s home.”113
Texas errs on the side of the child even more forcefully. If the state
CPS agency determines “the child would be protected in the child’s
home by the removal of the alleged perpetrator,” the agency “shall file a
petition” to exclude the alleged offender.114 The court must exclude the
parent from the home where it finds that the child has been sexually
abused and “there is substantial risk” that he or she will be abused again
if the parent remains in the residence.115

108
109
110

BOLEN, supra note 20, at 229.
V.C. v. H.C., 689 N.Y.S.2d 447, 453 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
ANNA C. SALTER, TREATING CHILD SEX OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS 42 (1988)
(quoting Roland Summit and JoAnn Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Clinical
Spectrum, 48 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 237, 242 (1978)).
111 Id.
112 19 GUAM CODE ANN. § 13316 (2004).
113 Id. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-53(f) (Michie 2004).
114 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (Vernon 2004).
115 Id. More specifically, a temporary restraining order will be issued by the court if
it satisfies these conditions: (1)imediate danger to the child of harm if a victim of sexual
abuse, (2) no time available for an adversary hearing, (3)the other parent will not abuse
the child, (4) the removal of the perpetrator is best for the child, and (5) the temporary
restraining order must expire by the fourteen day after issuance. Then the court may
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The radicalness of this approach is more apparent than real.
Domestic violence protective orders are issued countless times a day.116
Obviously, the key remedy is the court’s order to the batterer to “stay
away.”117 States do not consider this radical jurisprudence.118
Excluding an accused parent also mirrors actions taken in divorce
disputes between adults. Courts routinely direct one spouse to leave the
home.119 Finally, children are removed every day without even a
passing reference to the considerable power being wielded by the
State.120
The government routinely acts preemptively before criminal
adjudications. Bond hearings commonly “place restrictions on the . . .
place of abode of the person during the period of release” when that
person poses an “unreasonable danger to the community.”121 All
jurisdictions in the United States take such a concern into
consideration.122 Literally thousands of times each day, judges place
restrictions on persons presumed innocent. Concededly, a bond follows
arrest but, as with allegations of abuse, there has been no hearing on the
merits or conviction.
Moreover, viewing this remedy through a public health lens, as
Professor Garrison does, highlights the considerable power we have
given the state to contain threats to the public welfare. Every state is
authorized to contain the risk of infectious disease with means that
override the narrow autonomy interests of individual persons posing a
threat. Professor Lawrence Gostin observes that “[t]hrough the exercise
of compulsory powers, public health officials can require that people
who pose a threat to public health submit to medical examination,
testing, immunization, treatment, counseling, detention, isolation or
quarantine. Such restrictions may infringe an individual’s right to travel,

then continue the order if the child is not in danger from the other parent and is a victim
of sex abuse who faces risk if the alleged offender stays in the house. Id.
116 See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW
498 (2001).
117 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (2004).
118 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 116, at 498.
119 See, e.g., Jetter v. Jetter, 323 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1971).
120 AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CHILD ABUSE 278-279 (2002).
121 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2004).
122 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 34 (2004).
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secure privacy, maintain autonomy or associate.”123 As Part IV
illustrates in great detail, parents who offend against children in their
care engage in foreseeable patterns of predation, moving from one child
to the next. Their exclusion from the home is necessary to contain the
risk they pose to not only the victim, but other children in the household.
F. Due Process Concerns
Ultimatums raise significant and legitimate due process concerns.
Caseworkers may be tempted to use “voluntary” agreements as a means
of short-circuiting the normal protections built into the CPS system.
Pearson notes that “authorities sometimes employ coercive tactics . . . as
an avoidance of procedural safeguards for the handling of child abuse
investigations.”124 This short-circuiting of the normal procedural
protections simply cannot be condoned.
Forbidding exclusion is not the solution to such over-reaching,
however. Instead, we should institutionalize and heavily regulate this
remedy, as several states do. Maine extends the same process
protections to parents who are asked to exit the home as it does when
pursuing the equally drastic remedy of removing the child.125 These
protections include providing legal counsel for the parent, a guardian ad
litem for the child, notice and opportunity to participate in a hearing and,
where the order was issued on an emergency basis, a preliminary hearing
within fourteen days.126
Texas requires notice, a fourteen-day limit for any temporary
restraining order, and the satisfaction of a four-part test before a
temporary restraining order may issue.127 The state must show that
there “is no time, consistent with the physical health or safety of the
child, for an adversary hearing.”128 Kentucky courts instruct judges
who issue orders to alleged perpetrators to “stay out of the family home”
to do so with great specificity – defining the specific distance that the
person should stay away.129 Protective orders in New York must be for
a specified time period, initially not to exceed two years, or for a period
123

Lawrence Gostin et al., The Law and the Public Health: A Study of Infectious
Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 113 (1999).
124 Pearson, supra note 29, at 842-43.
125 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 4036(1)(F-1) (2004).
126 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 4005, 4033, 4034 (2004).
127 TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (Vernon 2004).
128 Id.
129 KY. JEFFERSON FAM. CT. APPENDIX B.
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not in excess of five years upon a finding by the court that certain
aggravating circumstances exist.130
Importantly, these statutes do not simply duplicate the protection
already available under domestic violence statutes – although many of
the latter would also be available to protect children.131 Domestic
violence statutes are
intended “[t]o allow family and household members
who are victims of domestic abuse to obtain effective,
short-term protection against further abuse. . . .”132
Any protective order issued under [such a statute] is
granted for a limited time only, not to exceed one year,
and is subject to interim review at either party’s
request.133
The Maine court cautioned counsel that protective orders are “not
the most efficient use of litigation resources for the final resolution of
the controversy” over access to the child.134 As the Court explained,
“[o]nce a temporary order safeguard[s] the child from immediate harm,”
proceedings to assure the child’s safety permanently – as CPS
proceedings do – should have followed.135
In contrast to domestic violence statutes, which generally require
someone to declare “protect me,”136 exclusion statutes do not rely on a
household member (like the child or mother) to ask for assistance.
Instead, they permit judges and caseworkers unilaterally to remove the
offender.137 Maine’s Department of Human Services can petition for a
protective order on behalf of a child who has been abused by a family
130
131

N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (2004).
Catherine F. Klien & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 820
(1993).
132 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 761(1) (repealed 1989) (emphasis added).
133 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 766(2) (repealed 1995).
134 Cooke v. Naylor, 573 A.2d at 379.
135 Id.
136 Klien & Orloff, supra note 131, at 846-847 (noting the paucity of statutes
permitting government attorneys to seek protective orders on behalf of a victim of
domestic violence or permitting one adult to seek this on behalf of another); KY REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.725 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-27-305, 48-27-204
(Michie 2003).
137 See In re A.H., 751 N.E.2d at 700 (upholding the removal of perpetrators not only
against due process claims, but also against claims that the exclusion of perpetrators is
inconsistent with controlling statutes).
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member and Maine law allows the court temporarily to enjoin the abuser
ex parte from “[e]ntering the family residence.”138 After a hearing, this
order may be made permanent for up to two years.139 Tennessee
authorizes its CPS agency to apply for a “no contact order” removing the
alleged perpetrator from the child’s home if there is probable cause that
the adult sexually abused the child.140 Other states also authorize state
agencies to take such steps.141

III. DISTRUST OF THE NON-OFFENDING PARENT
Numerous studies show that most caseworkers fiercely believe
mothers share the blame for abuse. In the 1990s, a series of studies
showed that sixty-seven to eighty-six percent of all CPS professionals
placed some blame on mothers, both for father-daughter incest and for
extra-familial sexual abuse.142 Some studies asked caseworkers to
assign relative responsibility for the abuse. In these, the fractional share
of responsibility attributed to mothers for the abuse ranged from eleven
to twenty-one percent.143 In Australia, Jan Breckenridge and Eileen
Baldry found that sixty-one percent of child protection workers felt that
some mothers knew of the abuse, while one in ten believed that most
mothers actually knew about the abuse. 144 In the United States, Patricia
Ryan and colleagues found that in 82.3% of the case reports from five

138
139
140
141

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A §§ 4005(1), 4006(5)(C) (2004).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A §§ 4005(1), 4007 (2004).
TEN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-152 (2004).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(b)(2) (Michie 2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
262.1015 (Vernon 2004) (authorizing the Texas Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services to file a petition). Even in jurisdictions where there is no statutory
provision which explicitly provides for the removal of perpetrators, courts have held that
the perpetrator can be removed from the family home. See, e.g., In re Macomber, 461
N.W.2d 671, 673-74 (Mich. 1990).
142 Pauline Johnson et al., Professionals Attributions of Censure in Father-Daughter
Incest, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 419, 422 (1990); S. J. Kelly, Responsibility and
Management Strategies in Child Sexual Abuse: A Comparison of Child Protective
Workers, Nurses, and Police Officers, 69 CHILD WELFARE 43, 46 (1990).
143 Seth C. Kalichman et al., Professionals’ Adherence to Mandatory Child Abuse
Reporting Laws: Effects of Responsibility Attribution, Confidence Ratings, and
Situational Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 69 tbl. 1 (1990); Kelly, supra note 142,
at 46 tbl. 1.
144 Jan Breckenridge & Eileen Baldry, Workers Dealing With Mother Blame in Child
Sexual Assault Cases, 6 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 65, 70 (1997).
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state, county, and private welfare agencies, caseworkers believed the
mothers knew about the abuse before it was reported.145
These suppositions of “maternal culpability” drive the choice to
remove the child.146 Assessments of “mother’s ability and willingness
to protect her child (1) before and (2) after the report of abuse . . . [best
explained the pattern of removal].”147 Eighty-two percent of the case
files indicated that mothers knew of the abuse.148
There is little support for this belief, however. As Ryan and
colleagues flatly observe, “[a]lthough the myth has been widely held that
[the non-abusing mother] is usually aware of the abuse and may contrive
in setting it up, this is infrequently the case.”149 In a study of sixty-five
cases of paternal incest, Kathleen Faller found that a mere five percent
of mothers knew about the daughter’s abuse but “felt powerless to stop
it.”150 A study of grandfather incest found that eighty-seven percent of
mothers never knew.151 In 1985, M.H. Myer found that at least
seventy-five percent of mothers were unaware of their partner’s
abuse.152 As Rebecca Bolen notes, across these studies, “75% to 95%
of mothers do not know about the ongoing abuse.”153
This is not surprising. Often, child victims never speak of their
abuse. Marcellina Mian and colleagues found that the rate of purposeful
(as opposed to unintentional) disclosure by the child decreased
significantly when the perpetrator was intra-familial.154 While a child’s
145
146
147
148
149

Ryan et al., supra note 11, at 130.
BOLEN, supra note 20, at 193.
Ryan et al., supra note 11, at 132.
Id.
Id. at 124. See also Rebecca M. Bolen & J. Leah Lamb, Ambivalence of
Nonoffending Guardians After Child Sexual Abuse Disclosure, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 185, 186 (2004) (that the ambivalence of a nonoffending parent to the
disclosure of suspected child abuse is not a midpoint on a linear scale capturing negative
to optimal levels of guardian support, but represents two competing valences – between
both the child and the perpetrator – that are triggered by allegations of abuse,
necessitating a more complex conceptualization of responses to abuse allegations).
150 Faller, supra note 17, at 67.
151 Leslie Margolin, Beyond Maternal Blame: Physical Child Abuse as a
Phenomenon of Gender, 3 JOURNAL OF FAMILY ISSUES 410, 412 (1992).
152 M.H. Myer, A New Look at Mothers of Incest Victims, 47 J. SOC. WORK & HUMAN
SEXUALITY 56 (1985).
153 BOLEN, supra note 20, at 230.
154 Marcellina Mian et al., Review of 125 Children 6 Years of Age and Under Who
Were Sexually Abused, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223, 226 tbl. 5 (1986). In fact, a
greater proportion of children victimized by family never tell (17.7%), than occurs with
children who are the victims of extrafamilial abuse (10.9%). Donald G. Fischer &
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disclosure may not be the only clue, other cues are also frequently
absent.
Sexual abuse is difficult to detect by non-offending mothers because
one third of sexually abused children have no apparent symptoms.155
Roughly half fail to display the classic, most characteristic symptom of
child sexual abuse: “sexualized” behavior.156 And as disquieting as it
is, “the more severe cases [are] the ones most likely to remain
secret.”157 Diana Russell reports that in seventy-two percent of the
cases where mothers were unaware of the abuse, more severe abuse had
occurred.158 All of this makes one wonder precisely how mothers
should have ferreted out their children’s abuse. Clearly, “[m]others
cannot report what they do not know.”159
Of course, mothers can be complicit in a child’s abuse. For instance,
in People v. T.G., a mother knew that her husband – the children’s
stepfather – was sexually abusing his stepdaughters, but she concealed
it.160 Nonetheless, absent unambiguous indications of a mother’s
complicity, caseworkers should assume that mothers did not simply go
along.
Nor is there any reason to believe that non-abusing mothers are not
protective after the abuse comes to light. Most are “very” or “mostly”
protective once they find out. A 1990 study found that seventy-four
percent of non-abusing mothers “either totally or largely believed the
child’s account of abuse,” while sixty-seven percent of mothers were
rated by the caseworkers as having average or better compliance with
the caseworker’s recommended treatment plan.161 A 1991 study by
Ryan and colleagues, in which caseworkers harshly assessed mothers’
knowledge of their child’s abuse, found that over half the mothers
(50.8%) acted “mostly” or “very” protective following the report.162
Wendy L. McDonald, Characteristics of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Child Sexual
Abuse, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 915, 926 (1998).
155 Kathleen Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review &
Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 164, 168 (1993).
156 Id.
157 DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND
WOMEN 373 (1986).
158 Id. at 372.
159 BOLEN, supra note 20, at 190.
160 South Dakota ex rel. v. T.G., 578 N.W.2d 921, 922 (S.D., 1998).
161 Alicia Pellegrin & William G. Wagner, Child Sexual Abuse: Factors Affecting
Victims Removal From Home, 14 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 53, 57 (1990).
162 Ryan et al., supra note 11, at 130.
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Importantly, most mothers believed the disclosure. Elizabeth Sirles and
Pamela Franke discovered that seventy-eight percent of mothers believe
the child’s report of alleged abuse.163 Although some studies show that
only a quarter of non-offending mothers were “very supportive,”164
such studies are a distinct minority.165 One meta-analysis concluded
that “75% of nonoffending guardians are partially or fully supportive
after disclosure [of sexual abuse].”166
In any event, if an unspoken concern that a “mother who failed once
will fail again” is forcing CPS’s decision to remove kids from the home,
caseworkers should assess the likelihood of a failure prospectively, with
validated assessment tools, rather than based only on the fact of the
child’s past abuse. Such tools exist in various jurisdictions inside and
outside the US and are used for precisely this purpose.167 For instance,
New Zealand utilizes a Risk Estimation System to evaluate a number of
risk factors in child abuse and neglect proceedings, including a mother’s
protective abilities.168 Illinois assesses a mother’s protective capacities
when deciding to remove an alleged offender from the home, although
Illinois’ methodology has not been validated.169 Rebecca Bolen has laid
the theoretical groundwork to assess the protective capacities of nonoffending mothers and has validated one instrument to do so.170
163 Elizabeth A. Sirles & Pamela J. Franke, Factors Influencing Mothers’ Reactions
to Intrafamily Sexual Abuse, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 131, 133 (1989).
164 Christine Adams-Tucker, Proximate Effects of Sexual Abuse in Childhood: A
Report on 28 Children, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1252, 1255 (1982).
165 Rebecca Bolen, Guardian Support of Sexually Abused Children: A Definition of a
Construct, 3 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 40, 47 (2002) [hereinafter Guardian
Support] (finding in a meta-analysis that most studies examining supportiveness of nonoffending mothers “clustered around 75%,” regardless of whether the study used “child
protective services, medical, or treatment samples”).
166 Id. at 40. See also Bolen & Lamb, supra note 149, at 186 (finding that even
ambivalence can mean support, as the nonoffending parent is in conflict between
supporting the child while experiencing some allegiance toward the perpetrator).
167 Guardian Support, supra note 165, at 59; NEW ZEALAND CHILD YOUTH & FAMILY
SERVICES, RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT UNIT, RISK ESTIMATION SYSTEM: REFERENCE
MANUAL 1 (2004) [hereinafter NEW ZEALAND] (on file with author).
168 NEW ZEALAND CHILD YOUTH & FAMILY SERVICES, RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT
UNIT, supra note 167, at 40.
169 Interview with Mark Testa, Director of Children and Family Research Center,
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, in Charlottesville, Va. (Oct. 29, 2004).
170 Guardian Support, supra note 165, at 42-46, 58-59. A non-offending mother’s
protectiveness should not, however, serve as a reason to allow an alleged offender to
remain in the home during the investigation. The role of secrecy in sexual abuse is well
established; offenders predictably exploit occasions on which a child’s mother is not
present. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of
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IV. REMOVAL OF THE ALLEGED OFFENDER PROTECTS NOT
JUST THE VICTIM BUT ALSO THE OTHER CHILDREN IN THE
HOME
Ironically, a default remedy that removes the child from the home,
rather than removing the alleged offender pending a full investigation,
sometimes leaves other children in the home at risk of abuse from the
same individual. The risk of substituting child victims is perhaps easiest
to see with claims of child sexual abuse.171
When a male parent sexually engages a child in his care, a question
frequently arises about the safety of other children in the household. For
a state to intervene to protect these children, the state must show that the
sibling more probably than not faces substantial risk of imminent harm
from the alleged offender.172 Once proven, it may remove the child,
supervise the family, or mandate “voluntary” treatment for the
perpetrator.173
For a number of reasons, judges reach wildly different judgments
regarding the risk to children left in the perpetrator’s care.174 Courts in
the United States generally react in one of the three following ways.
A. No Clear Risk
Some courts see no clear risk to the victim’s siblings. In In re Cindy
B, the New York Family Court refused to protect the siblings of an
incest victim, finding that the State produced no evidence “that the
physical . . . condition of any [sibling] . . . is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired” despite the fact that the father admitted sexual

the Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 307 (2001). A mother’s
protectiveness does bear on whether she will surreptiously permit the father to re-enter
the house after being exluded, and for this reason, is properly examined with the tools
described above.
171 It is common in cases of child physical abuse also to have multiple victims in the
same household. ALAN SUSMAN & MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS 73
(1980) (“The theory behind [a presumption of risk to siblings] is that evidence of abuse
or neglect of one child may indicate that other children in the same family are in extreme
danger of harm, and that it is not necessary for parents to maltreat each child in
succession for a court to intervene.”). See generally Karen S. Kassebaum, The Siblings
of Abused Children: Must They Suffer Harm Before Removal from the Home?, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1547 (1996) (charting the relationship between physical abuse of
one child and abuse of another).
172 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.52(1)(b) (2001).
173 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 107, at 533.
174 See Cradle of Abuse, supra note 103, at 245.
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intercourse with his oldest daughter, Cindy.175 Fifteen years later, the
New York Court of Appeals validated this approach in In Re Starr H,
where a mother’s live-in boyfriend inserted his finger into the vagina of
the mother’s twelve-year old daughter, Starr, while he “instructed her to
lick his penis ‘like an ice cream cone.’”176 The state CPS agency
petitioned the court to protect Starr and her siblings. Although the Court
of Appeals found that Starr was an abused child, her sexual abuse –
standing alone – was insufficient to find substantial risk to her
siblings.177 Similarly, Texas courts have refused to see risk to a
victim’s siblings in proceedings to terminate parental rights.178 In sum,
these courts courts consider sex with one child as an isolated act – a
fluke – rather than as critical evidence of a foreseeable pattern of
predation.
B. Obvious Risk to the Victim’s Siblings
In contrast to the “no-risk” view, the Ohio Court of Appeals in In re
Burchfield viewed the risk to a victim’s siblings as self-evident.179 It
held that “a child should not have to endure the inevitable to its great
detriment and harm in order to give the [parent] an opportunity to prove
[his] suitability.”180 The father digitally penetrated his five-year-old
daughter on two separate occasions. The court concluded “in light of
[the daughter’s sexual abuse], it follows that so long as the father was in
the home with [her siblings] the environment of these children was such
as to warrant the state to assume guardianship.”181 Very simply, “the
law does not require the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to
see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.”182 Courts in Arizona,
California, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Washington,
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota also see this risk as a “no-brainer.”183
175
176
177
178

In re Cindy B., 471 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (Fam. Ct. 1983).
In re Starr H., 550 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767 (App. Div. 1998).
Id.
See, e.g., Lane v. Jefferson County Child Welfare Unit, 564 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tx.
Ct. App. 1978).
179 In re Burchfield, 555 N.E.2d 325, 333 (Ohio App. 1988).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Dependency Action No. 118537, 912 P.2d
1306, 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); In re Dorothy I., 209 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); In re Rhianna R., 684 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); State ex. rel.
Juvenile Dept. v. Smith, 853 P.2d 282, 285 (Or. 1993); In re Daniel B., 642 A.2d 672,
673 (R.I. 1994); In re J.A.H., 502 N.W.2d 120, 124 (S.D. 1993); In re M.B., 480 N.W.2d
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C. Prior Victimization is One Factor
In 2000, the Florida Supreme Court announced that a victim’s
violation is relevant, but not dispositive, in determining the risk to a
victim’s siblings. In In re MF, a father had “union” with the vagina of
his stepchild, who was under the age of 12.184 Following his
incarceration, the state CPS agency filed suit to remove the father’s two
biological children from their mother’s care based in part on the
possibility of future abuse by the father. In a sharply divided per curiam
opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that a parent’s commission of a
sex act with one child was, by itself, insufficient to support a ruling of
dependency as to the victim’s siblings.
Even when judges agree about the risk to the victim’s siblings,
however, they often differ sharply about the impact of a sibling’s gender,
age, ordinal position, and genetic relatedness on the magnitude of the
sibling’s risk.185 Despite these splits, courts can call on considerable
social science data to better protect the victim’s siblings, as the next subPart makes clear.
D. Unmistakable Evidence of the Risk to Other Children
The evidence of serial offending is overwhelming and chilling.
Vincent De Francis studied 250 sexual abuse cases and found that
twenty-two percent of perpetrators victimized between two and five
children.186 Kathleen Faller studied 196 paternal caretakers whom she
classified in two ways: biological father-offenders and father-substitutes,
including stepfathers, mother’s cohabitants, and mother’s boyfriends.187
Faller found that four out of every five biological fathers abused more
than one child in the household, as did two out of three of the father
substitutes.188 In many cases, every child in the household was a victim

160, 162 (Neb. 1992); Tyner v. State Dep’t of Social and Health Services, 963 P.2d 215,
220 (Wash. App. Div. 1998); Viruet ex rel v. Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 596 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999).
184 In re M.F., 770 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 2000).
185 See Cradle of Abuse, supra note 103, at 245.
186 VINCENT DE FRANCIS, AM. HUMANE ASS’N CHILDREN’S DIV., PROTECTING THE
CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS: FINAL REPORT 23, 58 (1969).
187 Faller, supra note 17, at 67-68.
188 Id.
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of incest.189 Patricia Phelan found similar results in a study of 102
cases of father-daughter incest. There, biological fathers molested
eighty-two percent of all daughters available to them, while stepfathers
molested seventy percent of all available daughters.190
The pattern is repeated again and again. Judith Herman and Lisa
Hirschman studied forty families in which there were allegations of
father-daughter incest.191 Victims in fifty-three percent of the families
reported another victim or that they “strongly suspected” incest with a
sibling had taken place.192 In forty-seven percent of the cases, the
victims said there was no indication of other victims; however, there
were no other possible victims in the household in one-third of these
families.193 Similarly, in Diana Russell’s landmark study of 930
women in San Francisco, one half of the children abused by a stepfather
reported at least one other sibling as a victim, while one-third of the
victims abused by a father reported other sibling-victims.194 Edward
Farber studied the medical records of 162 molestation cases, which
yielded a smaller percentage of cases of repeat incest with another child
(twenty-eight percent).195 However, while seventy-two percent of the
records Farber examined gave no indication of additional incest, in
forty-one percent of those cases, no one inquired whether there were
other victims.196
These figures may actually underestimate the incidence of serial
predation given the intense secrecy surrounding incest and the common
belief by victims that they alone are being molested.197
Other studies of incest perpetrators themselves also confirm that
perpetrators frequently access several children in their care. In a study
of 383 incest offenders, David Ballard and colleagues constructed a

189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id.
Phelan, supra note 18, at 534.
HERMAN & HIRSCHMAN, supra note 105, at 94 tbl. 5.4 (1981).
Id.
Id.
RUSSELL, supra note 157, at 242.
Edward D. Farber et al., The Sexual Abuse of Children: A Comparison of Male
and Female Victims, 13 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 294, 296 (1984).
196 Id.
197 RUSSELL, supra note 157, at 242; W.D. Erickson et al., Behavior Patterns of Child
Molesters, 17 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV., 77, 85 (1988) (“Even in families where
there are multiple perpetrators and victims, sexual contacts tend to be furtive, concealed
from other family members, and involve only one child per contact.”).
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profile of perpetrators that included abuse history.198 They found that
33.9% had at least one additional incestuous relationship after the
first.199 Although frightening on its face, perhaps more terrifying is
how this number breaks down. As one might expect, the largest
subgroup, 12.8%, had one additional incestuous relationship.200 The
second largest category, 8.4%, represented perpetrators who admitted
five or more additional incestuous relationships.201 Not surprisingly,
Ballard concluded that incest offenders “often have histories of large
numbers of victims.”202
Although the risk to siblings is clear, not all children are equally at
risk. The gender of the victim and siblings, as well as the age at which
the victim’s abuse began, all affect the magnitude of a sibling’s risk.203
Certain children face only a slim chance of becoming victims. For
instance, a son is at minimal risk following father-daughter incest that
begins in the daughter’s teenage years.204 Absent other indicators of
risk, the male child in this household is not likely to be victimized.205
Given these damning studies of serial victimization, the risk to
siblings seems obvious. Nonetheless, some early studies of recidivism
among incest offenders suggested that an offender – once caught –
would just stop. These studies projected that only four to ten percent of
incest offenders would be recidivists.206 New and better constructed
studies now suggest that incest offenders remain a continuing threat.
Yet, before assessing this new research, it is important to review the
early studies as they offer significant insights into the risk to siblings
that have been overlooked thus far.

198

David T. Ballard et al., A Comparative Profile of the Incest Perpetrator:
Background, Characteristics, Abuse History, and Use of Social Skills, in 43 THE INCEST
PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT 53-54 tbl. 3.2 (Anne L.
Horton et al., eds., 1990).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 46.
203 See generally Cradle of Abuse, supra note 103.
204 Id. at 264-266.
205 Id. at 266.
206 David Finkelhor, Abusers: Special topics, in 119 A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 134-135 (David Finkelhor et al., eds., 1986); Vernon L Quinsey et al.,
Predicting Sexual Offenses, in 114 ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL
OFFENDERS, BATTERERS, AND CHILD ABUSERS 125 (Jacquelyn C. Campbell ed., 1995).
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In the early studies, incest offenders seemed much less threatening
than offenders who strike outside the home. Vikkie Sturgeon and John
Taylor’s 1980 study of 260 mentally-disoriented sex offenders compared
the reconviction rates of heterosexual pedophiles, homosexual
pedophiles, and incestuous offenders (whether heterosexual or
homosexual), and found that reconvictions for sexual crimes were
twenty percent for heterosexual pedophiles compared to fifteen percent
for homosexual pedophiles and five percent for incest offenders.207
Thus, incest offenders initially presented only modest risks of reoffending.208 However, other evidence in the same study undercuts the
incest perpetrator’s image of relative safety.
Looking at prior
convictions for sexual crimes within each group, the researchers found
that nineteen percent of incest offenders had prior convictions.209
Although this percentage fell significantly short of the percentages for
heterosexual pedophiles (forty-three percent) and homosexual
pedophiles (fifty-three percent), the findings nonetheless confirm that
significant numbers of child incest perpetrators – one in five – do indeed
engage in a pattern of repeat offenses.210
In short order, researchers began faulting the early studies. The
Packard Foundation’s Center for the Future of Children noted that
recidivism is “extremely difficult to measure because many sex crimes
may not result in arrest or conviction [and because] . . . official data are
often inaccurate or outdated.”211 Recidivism studies yield misleading
appraisals of risk as they largely follow incarcerated offenders, which is
not the typical sentence for incest.212 Finally, the early studies simply
missed recidivism that occurred many years later, a frequent occurrence
with child molesters.213

207 Vikki Henlie Sturgeon & John Taylor, Report of a Five-year Follow-up Study of
Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Released from Atascadero State Hospital in 1973, 4
CRIM. JUST. J. 31, 57-58 tbl.x (1980).
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Carol Larson et al., Sexual Abuse of Children: Recommendations and Analysis, 4
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 1, 13 (Summer/Fall 1994).
212 Finkelhor, supra note 206, at 132-133; Non-offending Mothers, supra note 21, at
1350 (noting that “the legal system incarcerates only a small percentage of [incest]
offenders”).
213 See generally L. C. MEYER & J. ROMERO, TEN YEAR FOLLOW-UP OF SEX OFFENDER
RECIDIVISM (Joseph J. Peters Institute 1980).
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Recent studies also take issue with the provincial belief that incest
offenders will not re-offend. In the most prominent of these, Lea Studer
and colleagues grouped 220 patients who participated in an Alberta,
Canada treatment program for sex offenders into offenders whose index
victims were related to them (incestuous offenders) and those who were
caught with an unrelated child (extra-familial abusers).214 They
compared the rates at which each reported offending against other
children within and outside the home. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
“22% of the incestuous group had prior offenses against a related child”
suggesting that “repeat offenses may not be so rare.” 215 Significantly,
only twelve percent of offenders who victimized an unrelated child
reported violations against related children, making incest offenders
statistically nearly twice as likely to report other related victims.216 As
Dr. Studer notes:
[I]f the ‘dogma’ [of the incest offender’s low propensity
to re-offend] were theoretically and clinically sound
(incest offenders being an entirely separate and discrete
group), the [reported rate of other related victims among
incest offenders] should approach 0% . . . . The fact that
[0%] is so far from [the reported value] says as much as
any real differences [between incest offenders and nonincestuous ones].217
The early distinction between incest offenders and other child
molesters falls apart for other reasons too.218 Incest offenders and child
molesters who strike outside the family have “very similar arousal
patterns,” indistinguishable erotic preferences, and “disturbingly high”

214

Lea H. Studer et al., Rethinking Risk Assessment for Incest Offenders, 23 INT’L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 15, 15 (2000).
215 Id. at 18.
216 Id.
217 Letter from Lea Studer, M.D., F.R.C.P.C., Psychiatrist, Phoenix Program, Alberta
Hospital Edmondton, Alberta, Canada, to Prof. Robin Fretwell Wilson (Feb. 13, 2002)
(on file with author).
218 E.g., Ian Barsetti et al., The Differentiation of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial
Heterosexual Child Molesters, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 275, 275-276 (1998);
Philip Firestone et al., Prediction of Recidivism in Incest Offenders, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE, 511, 512 (1999); Lea H. Studer et al., Primary Erotic Preference in a Group
of Child Molesters, 25 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter Primary Erotic
Preference].
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deviant sexual arousal to children.219 Many child abuse researchers
now question the extent to which “different categories of offenders,
particularly intra-familial and extra-familial, are different from each
other.”220 Indeed, the classification of sex offenders into two groups,
incest offenders and pedophiles, was “prematurely disseminated as [it
does] not appear to be valid.”221 Clearly, the older view that incest
offenders are a special category who will not re-offend is invalid and
must be discarded.
Although these studies alone justify a presumption that a perpetrator
who strikes once within the family will strike again,222 there are a
number of sound public policy reasons for presuming risk to other kids
in the family. First, a presumption of risk assists CPS caseworkers who,
without clear guidelines, may be slow to react or may not act at all.
Additionally, a presumption fairly places the burden on the offender to
prove the child’s safety and errs on the side of additional protection for
other children. After all, the offender is the primary determinant of
repeat performances. Finally, presuming risk gives courts judicial
discretion to act protectively if they sense risk to the siblings rather than
requiring harm before acting.
Although this snapshot of serial predation warrants reforms I have
outlined elsewhere — to place the burden of proving the sibling’s safety
on offenders, and to improve judicial predictions of risk223 — we should
embrace fundamental change. The offender should be removed from the
home – pending a full investigation – rather than the victim. Part V
explores a number of possible limitations to excluding alleged offenders
form the home, but argues that these are easily overcome.
219

Barsetti et al., supra note 218, at 283; Primary Erotic Preference, supra note 218,
at 2; Philip Firestone et al., Prediction of Recidivism in Incest Offenders, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 512, 512-513 (1999).
220 SALTER, supra note 110, at 49 (quoting Roland Summit & JoAnn Kryso, Sexual
Abuse of Children: A Clinical Spectrum, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 237 (1978)).
221 Jon R. Conte, The Nature of Sexual Offenses Against Children, in 11 CLINICAL
APPROACHES TO SEX OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 25 (C.R. Hollins & K. Howells,
eds. 1999) (on file with author).
222 Removal of the alleged offender may offer some protection to non-offending
mothers as well. A number of studies have suggested that households in which child
abuse occurs are at increased risk for domestic violence as well. See Tom Lyon &
Mindy Mechanic, Domestic Violence and Child Protection: Confronting the Dilemmas
in Moving From Family Court to Dependency Court, in HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN,
CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE (N. Dowd, D. Singer & R.F. Wilson eds., forthcoming 2006)
(discussing the overlap between spousal abuse and child sexual abuse).
223 See Cradle of Abuse, supra note 103, at 271, 307.
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V. LIMITATIONS OF REMOVING ALLEGED OFFENDERS
FROM THE HOME
Exclusion of alleged offenders is not without some potential
problems. Just as a child who is removed from his home may
experience guilt, so may a child whose parent is ejected, especially when
the “family suffers economically.”224 In addition, like the decision to
remove a child, the decision to exclude an alleged offender is made
“against a background of urgency and inadequate information” and will
sometimes be unwarranted.225 However, the fact an allegation may
later prove unfounded should not, by itself, dissuade us from using this
remedy. These error costs are no greater than those that occur when the
state removes a child who is later found not to have been abused.
The real “difficulty with restraining orders is that they are hard to
enforce and, in the case of child sexual assault, depend upon the
presence of an adult ally for the child to monitor the situation and to
report any violation of the restraining order.”226 Clearly, it is essential
that the non-abusing parent is alert. For example, British authorities will
not exclude an accused parent during an investigation if another adult in
the home is not willing to care for the child227 or does not consent to the
exclusion.228 To secure a restraining order in Texas, the court must find
that the child “is not in danger of abuse from a parent . . . with whom the
child will continue to reside.”229 The remaining parent must “make a
reasonable effort to monitor the residence” and agree to report any
attempts by the excluded parent to return home.230 The failure to do
these things is a misdemeanor, as is the perpetrator’s return to the
residence.231 Although blanket suppositions of a non-offending parent’s
complicity in a child’s abuse are generally not warranted, as discussed
224
225

Ryan et al., supra note 11, at 125.
John Pickett & Andy Maton, Protective Casework and Child Abuse: Practice and
Problems, in 56 THE CHALLENGE OF CHILD ABUSE 63 (Alfred White Franklin, ed., 1977).
226 Patricia A. Graves & Suzanne M. Sgroi, Law Enforcement and Child Sexual
Abuse in 309 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL INTERVENTION IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 328
(Suzanne M. Sgroi, ed., Lexington Books 1982) (on file with author).
227 Children Act, 1989, c. 41 § 38A (on file with author).
228 Children Act, 1989, c. 41 § 38A(3) (on file with author).
229 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (Vernon 2004).
230 Id.
231 Id. If the perpetrator has been convicted of returning, recidivism constitutes a
felony.
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above, without the non-offending parent’s assistance and consent,
exclusion of the alleged offender is not an option.
It is possible that there are a set of women, especially those who are
the victims of domestic violence, who will not be sufficiently protective
of their children after an allegation of child abuse by their partner.
Given the overwhelming evidence that non-offending mothers are
supportive, however, the remedy to prevent such a failure would be a
screen for domestic violence, and more specifically, the failure of a
battered spouse to fail to protect prospectively, rather than than reflexive
assumptions of such a failure by caseworkers.
A more intractable problem is the need to replace the income that
the alleged offender provides to the home during his absence. For
biological fathers, paternity imposes a duty of support and provides one
means of dealing with the economic hardship that may result.232
Further, many states provide for child support on a temporary basis; such
emergency maintenance, in fact, is often received by battered spouses
whose partners have been excluded from the home.233 Any reform of
state law to permit an alleged offender’s removal should provide
explicitly for emergency maintenance, just as legislatures have done in
cases of domestic violence. Removal and placement of a child in foster
care is horribly expensive, as Professor Garrison explains.234
Legislatures should also consider directing some of these savings into
support of the household that remains behind. More fundamentally,
however, the possibility of financial hardship should not persuade us
from removing alleged offenders from the home, opting instead for
removal of the child. Financial hardships do not restrain society from
incarcerating or otherwise criminally penalizing offenders. Some costs
are simply unavoidable.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that “[w]e need to develop alternatives to prosecution that
can increase children’s safety without making them leave their

232
233

See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
Klien & Orloff, supra note 131, at 886 (discussing the effect of restraining orders
on a later proceeding ordering child support).
234 Garrison, supra note 1, at 612 (noting that “[t]he cost of a year’s placement in
foster care may be as high as $50,000”).
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homes.”235 The easiest, most direct route to this is to take the alleged
offender out of the home, rather than the children. As the Washington
state legislature has declared, “removing the child from the home often
has the effect of further traumatizing the child. It is, therefore, the
legislature’s intent that the alleged offender, rather than the child, shall
be removed from the home and that this should be done at the earliest
possible point of intervention.”236
Although the perceived “inability to remove the offender” remains
strong, Professor Garrison’s public health model not only highlights the
risks that wanton removal of child victims poses for the child victim –
and sometimes for the children left behind – but more importantly, it can
guide us in constructing a safer path forward. Like the systemic issues
she confronts, Professor Garrison’s medical model can improve the
crucial early decisions that put into motion everything else. If we
candidly embrace this powerful analytical tool, fewer children will
needlessly endure the trauma of being taken from the felt security of
their home.237

235
236
237

Cross et al., supra note 23, at 43.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.063 (2004).
Professor Garrison’s foundational reorientation would make even Judge Posner
proud. See Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews: Welcome to a World Where
Inexperienced Editors Make the Wrong Topics Worse, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2004),
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_
posner_novdec04.html (arguing that the scholarship offered by law professors tends to
be narrowly doctrinal, having departed from the previous model of legal scholarship that
offered a valuable service to the judiciary through its insightful analysis).

